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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE
A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR HUMAN LIMITATIONS ON
CYBERDISCOVERY
Richard Esenberg
Abstract
Many lawyers, whether by training or disposition, have come to regard
discovery as a process in which no stone is to be left unturned. With the
advent of electronically stored information, the stones have become too
numerous to account. Discovery rules that seek the perfection of preserving
and producing all potentially pertinent information have become the enemy
of the good. This article calls for a more pragmatic—and modest—
approach.
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INTRODUCTION
I show my civil procedure students a video on electronically stored
information (ESI) created by E-discovery experts Jason Baron and Ralph
Losey.1 The video, set to the type of pulsating electronic music normally
heard prior to kickoff, sets forth a series of factoids about ESI: there will
soon be more bytes of ESI than stars in the universe; it would take six
million years to read each web page in the known universe; and we are
awash in trillions of emails, tweets, text messages, and Google searches.2
 Vice President & General Counsel, Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, and Adjunct
Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
1. Jason R. Baron & Ralph E. Losey, E-Discovery: Did You Know?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 11,
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWbJWcsPp1M&feature=player_embedded.
2. Id.
965
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The video also refers to studies showing that most of this information is
never produced—and often not even thought of—in the discovery process.3
In fact, the most common forms of retrieval, such as Boolean keyword
searches, find a relatively small percentage of “relevant” documents.4
Baron and Losey acknowledge that litigants now cannot “afford the whole
truth” because of the difficulty they face sorting through billowing
information, but Baron and Losey suggest (with, I hope and suspect,
tongue-in-cheek) that this process may become easier in the “far future”
with the advent of discovery conducted by artificial intelligence agents.
The answer to the challenges of E-discovery, in other words, is the creation
of E-lawyers.
The video is an engaging and well-done representation of an emerging
genre in the litigation literature, which I prefer to call “Electronic Gothic.”
It tends, unintentionally or otherwise, to frighten litigants and lawyers
about the irresistible world of litigation holds, search protocols, document
retention, records preservation, data recovery, data mining, metadata, and
iterative multi-phase discovery. The video tales about sanctions for the loss
or destruction of information that a party did not know it had, was (at least
subjectively) unaware that is was obligated to keep, or had inadvertently
deleted.
Baron and Losey’s prediction of the “far future” may be closer than we
think,5 as law firms have formed E-discovery groups, and lawyers have
fashioned careers as “E-discovery attorneys.” One such lawyer recently
admonished law students to embrace their “inner geek,” saying, “If . . . you
did not go to law school to work with computers and databases, then you
might want to rethink being a litigator . . . .”6 Another prominent Ediscovery expert pointed out that lawyers tend to be drawn to the
profession as a result of a certain acuity in “liberal arts logical analysis”—
the verbal and analytic skills that have traditionally been at the heart of the
lawyerly craft. The profession, he suggested, thus needs to remake itself.
Absent a disaster that sends civilization back to the Stone Age, the
digital life is here to stay and thus so too are the dilemmas inherent in the
ever-mounting growth of E-discovery. The complexity of managing ESI in
litigation is almost certain to ensue as the possibilities of what can be
created and where it can be sent become increasingly robust. While some
of these advances may aid in the management of E-discovery, it seems a
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id.
Id.
See Baron & Losey, supra note 1.
Alison A. Grounds, Evolving Technology and Strategies in the Area of E-Discovery, in
ELECTRONIC RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND E-DISCOVERY: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING
RECENT TRENDS, UNDERSTANDING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AND IMPLEMENTING AN E-DISCOVERY
STRATEGY 61 (Michaela Falls ed., Aspatore 2010), available at 2010 WL 3251514, at *14 (Aug.
2010).
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safe bet, as Baron and Losey suggest,7 that the location and production of
ESI is going to prove much harder before becoming appreciably easier. Yet
I want to propose that the answer—even in the near term—is not to lament
our inability to get at the “whole truth” and dream of robo-lawyers.
Whether Baron and Losey are right in suggesting that we cannot afford
“the whole truth,”8 it is beyond doubt that ESI cannot be treated like paper
in discovery.
But it is less obvious that much of the “truth” is really lost. The idea,
undergirding much of discovery practice, that any information, which
might conceivably be helpful to any issue, ought to be available for perusal
is a notion that only lawyers could love. Other professions—doctors,
engineers, scientists—have long had to accept the reality that a certain,
fungible quantity of information will suffice as “enough” and live with the
ensuing uncertainty. However, the notion of open discovery, self-interest
(more discovery means more business), and the human fear of “missing
something”9 seem to have made lawyers peculiarly resistant to the idea of
“enough” information.10
While the growth of ESI is inevitable, it faces an unmovable limiting
principle; that is, regardless how voluminous and dynamic electronic
information may become, human beings stay blissfully limited in their
capacity to process that information. As long as litigation remains an
endeavor of mortals, the percentage of nonduplicative ESI that is in fact
relevant to the “whole truth” is likely to remain rather limited. Aided by
modern technology, people are increasingly reducing their thoughts (even
random ones) to an electronic format. But only so much of this information
can ever be used. Consequently, it is unlikely that all—or even a
substantial part—will be either relevant to the object of litigation or
necessary for the fair resolution of an underlying controversy.
The development of E-discovery principles and rules have been an
effort to balance cost against the value of the information by utilizing the
traditional discovery tools of judicial management—namely, ad hoc and
factually-intensive balancing. This will continue to be necessary. But I
want to suggest another paradigm. As ESI continues to proliferate,
7. See Baron & Losey, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. Because ESI results in more human communication being recorded, it fuels the dream of
the “smoking gun”—the idea that, in a fit of candor, ill-temper or frustration, someone will write
something that becomes “money” for the requesting party. It is unclear, however, whether the
ability to get at random thoughts that were previously unrecorded actually results in more accurate
litigation outcomes.
10. See, e.g., LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., RESHAPING THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE NEED FOR CLEAR, CONCISE, AND MEANINGFUL AMENDMENTS TO KEY
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 30 (May 2, 2010), available at http://www.thefederation.org/documents
/V60N3_WhitePaper.pdf (“Many attorneys believe that zealous advocacy requires extensive
discovery.”).
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organizations will have to find ways to retain and access information that is
necessary to conduct business; that is, to sell and design things, to hire and
fire people and to do all the other things that happen in the real world and
often the subject of litigation.
There ought to be, at minimum, a strong presumption that the retention
and retrieval policies created to manage this information, independent of
the litigation process, are likely to catch almost all the information that is
relevant within it.11 Although this concept has found its way into the 2006
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and pertinent case
law, there is still more work to be done.
I. ESI IS DIFFERENT
A. The Challenges of ESI
The digitalization of life has threatened to overwhelm the process of
relatively unfettered, party-directed discovery. The challenges presented by
the discovery of ESI may not be entirely “new,” but they are certainly
“more.”12 The electronic revolution has resulted in a substantial—indeed
geometric—increase in matters committed to writing. What may have been
communicated by phone or in person, or not communicated at all, may
now be expressed in emails, text messages, tweets, etc. Efforts to retrieve
information or records of the transmission of these communications that, in
the past, were unlikely to have even been created are now memorialized in
the records of search engines and the “metadata” of information systems.13
Human interactions and communications are now increasingly recorded
somewhere. As two commentators recently observed:
11. Some suggest that normal record management systems should be either driven by—or
framed with—E-discovery in mind. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 261 F.R.D.
44, 51–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The day undoubtedly will come when burden arguments based on a
large organization's lack of internal ediscovery [sic] software will be received about as well as the
contention that a party should be spared from retrieving paper documents because it had filed them
sequentially, but in no apparent groupings, in an effort to avoid the added expense of file folders or
indices.”); Steven C. Bennett, Records Management: The Next Frontier in E-Discovery?, 41 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 519, 520 (2009) (arguing that records management can support the E-discovery
process); Grounds, supra note 5, 2010 WL 3251514, at *12 (“I am seeing a trend where the makers
of electronic records management systems are understanding that there needs to be an E-discovery
component in their systems . . . .”). My suggestion here is that it ought to be business necessity—
and not the needs of litigation—that should drive records management.
12. One commentator notes that “E-discovery expenses of $3,000,000 in just five months are
fairly commonplace . . . .” Ralph C. Losey, Lawyers Behaving Badly: Understanding
Unprofessional Conduct in E-Discovery, 60 MERCER L. REV. 983, 1000 (2002) (referencing, as an
example, Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. NASCAR, Inc., No. 05-138-WOB, 2006 WL 5097354 (E.D.
Ky. Dec. 18, 2006)).
13. “Metadata” may identify who created the document, the date it was created, and when it
was opened or edited. See Jessica DeBono, Comment, Preventing and Reducing Costs and Burdens
Associated with E-Discovery: The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59
MERCER L. REV. 963, 968 (2008).
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Information inflation reflects the fact that civilization has
entered a new phase. Human beings are now integrated into
reality quite differently than before. They can instantaneously
write to millions. They engage in the real time writing of
instant messages, wikis, blogs, and avatars. Accordingly, the
flux of writing has grown exponentially, with resulting impact
on cultural evolution. All this affects litigation. Vast
quantities of new writing forms challenge the legal profession
to exercise novel skills.14
This is the temptation of E-discovery: the notion that “somewhere” in that
mass of information “someone” may have written “something” that will be
relevant to the issues in litigation.
As more records are created, the possibility becomes far more likely for
those documents not to just remain in existence “somewhere,” but rather
often in multiple places. For instance, an electronic document can be
repeatedly duplicated and transmitted to numerous recipients. Thus, it can
be found in numerous “places”—not all of which are self-evident. The
advent of “cloud computing” and applications like Google documents (or
the simple fact that home computers may be put to business and
professional use) raises the likelihood that certain documents may reside
“out” of the responding organization.
The storage of electronic information, while expensive, is easier and
less expensive than the retention of what have traditionally been much
smaller quantities of paper records. These stored records can, moreover,
often be searched electronically to identify some subset of at least
potentially relevant materials. This, too, creates opportunities to find
“something” that might advance a litigant’s cause.
But there are other aspects of ESI that confound these opportunities.
Electronic data is dynamic. It can be altered—sometimes automatically and
unintentionally—through the normal operation of the system that created
it. Because there is a cost—both in dollars and system efficiencies—to
retaining information, information may be automatically deleted or
“overwritten.” While its deletion may not be irrevocable, it may make it
relatively inaccessible—that it can be recovered only at great cost and
effort.
We can go on: As the volume of information metastasizes, it surpasses
the capacity of lawyers—and traditional electronic search methods—to
review it all. This is true despite that ESI will generally have associated
“metadata” that may provide information about when documents were
created, altered, and transmitted. Deciphering that data (and even the
documents themselves) may require an understanding—or even the use—
14. George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?,
13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, 41 (2007), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v13i3/article10.pdf.
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of the system on which they were created. Furthermore, as previously
mentioned, ESI may be automatically deleted or altered; thus, the onset of
litigation (or the apprehension of its potential) may require intervention to
suspend those processes. Although notions of preserving relevant
evidence—or sanctioning parties for spoliation—are not new,
implementing these “litigation holds” is complicated and expensive,15
requiring an understanding of just where diffuse forms of information can
be found and predicting what may be relevant to litigation in which the
claims and defenses may be nascent, ill-defined, and imperfectly
understood.
Finally, efforts to locate, preserve, and retrieve ESI are less transparent
and straightforward than simply searching paper records. They require the
application of expertise and can often result in complicated disputes about
what can and cannot be readily obtained, leading to satellite litigation and
“discovery about discovery.”16 This substantially increases the cost of
discovery management and disputes. It requires software, consultants, and
as noted earlier, attorneys specially versed in the nature of the game.
B. Responding to the Challenges
Of course, these problems have not gone unnoticed and unaddressed. In
2004, a group of prominent jurists, practitioners, and academics announced

15. One commentator describes the process as follows:
A litigation hold consists of several components that must be implemented in a
timely manner. The time element is extremely important when dealing with
electronically stored information because such information can be destroyed or
modified in the usual course of a company's business and a computer system's
routine operations. A litigation hold must be customized to the anticipated
litigation, depending on the nature and scope of the claims; however, a number of
different procedures and records should be included in most cases. First, notice of
the litigation hold should be provided to all relevant employees to preserve
information. Second, a plan establishing how relevant electronically stored
information will be retrieved and preserved must be created. Third, notice (and
records of such notice) directing record custodians to suspend the destruction of
relevant information should be maintained. Fourth, a record identifying what
evidence has been preserved should be created. Fifth, monitoring procedures to
ensure employees are utilizing the litigation hold should be implemented. Sixth,
notification (and records of such notification) regarding the termination of the
hold when litigation is no longer anticipated should be maintained.
DeBono, supra note 13, at 987–88 (citations omitted).
16. Paul W. Grimm et al., Discovery About Discovery: Does the Attorney-Client Privilege
Protect All Attorney-Client Communications Relating to the Preservation of Potentially Relevant
Information?, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 413, 426 (2008) (“Parties are permitted to inquire into an
opponent’s efforts to preserve relevant information through interrogatories and in depositions
directed to the opposing client.”).
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(and then subsequently revised) the Sedona Principles.17 These fourteen
principles seek to balance the need for discovery of ESI against its cost and
unique challenges. They create a duty to preserve information but not one
that requires a party to take “every conceivable step”18 or preserve
“deleted, shadowed, fragmented, or residual”19 information absent a
showing of special need and relevance. In ordering discovery, courts
should balance “cost, burden[,] and need,” while considering the “nature of
the litigation and the amount in controversy.”20 The primary (but
apparently not exclusive) focus of E-discovery should be on “active data
and information” as opposed to disaster recovery back-up tapes and other
sources that are not reasonably accessible.21 Cost-shifting from the
responding to the requesting party can happen on satisfaction of a multifactor test.22 One commentator recently extolled the “enduring relevance”
of the Principles.
In a now-famous series of opinions from the case of Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC,23 Judge Shira A. Scheindlin attempted a similar balance in
the context of employment litigation involving the preservation and
production of a large volume of emails.24 The decisions, now a staple of
most civil procedure textbooks, largely track the Sedona Principles, yet
adopt a modified framework, calling for a level of discovery and burden
that is just right. The Zubulake series repeated the now well-accepted
notion that “the universe of discoverable material has expanded
exponentially” and “discovery is not just about uncovering the truth, but
also about how much of the truth parties can afford to disinter.”25 The
cases recognized a seven-factor test for shifting the cost of discovery.26
17. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS
& PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 60–66 (Jonathan M. Redgrave
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_
PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf (explaining that unless it is material to resolving the dispute, there is no
obligation to preserve and produce metadata absent an agreement between the parties or an order of
the court).
18. Id. at 28.
19. Id. at 49.
20. Id. at 17.
21. Id. at 45.
22. Id. at 67.
23. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
24. Id. at 311, 313.
25. Id. at 311 (citing Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 423
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
26. Id. at 324. The factors are:
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant
information;
2. The availability of such information from other sources;
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each
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But this cost shifting, at least in Judge Scheindlin's view, should
not apply to readily accessible ESI, the normal rules of discovery
should apply.27 The decisions made clear that a party must
implement a “litigation hold” on ESI once it is on notice—that is, the
party knows or should know—that the information may be relevant
to current or future litigation:
Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend
its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in
place a “litigation hold” to ensure the preservation of relevant
documents. As a general rule, that litigation hold does not
apply to inaccessible backup tapes . . . , which may continue
to be recycled on the schedule set forth in the company's
policy. On the other hand, if backup tapes are accessible . . . ,
then such tapes would likely be subject to the litigation hold.28
In a later decision, the Zubalake court further elaborated the specific
requirements necessitated under these circumstances: “First, counsel must
issue a ‘litigation hold’ . . . whenever litigation is reasonably
anticipated . . . .”29 Counsel also has a continuing duty to remind
employees that the litigation hold is still in effect.30 “Second, counsel
should communicate . . . with ‘key players’” and remind them of the duty
to preserve.31 Further, “counsel must become fully familiar with her client's
document retention policies . . . .”32 “Finally, counsel should instruct all
employees to produce . . . [all] relevant active files” and ensure the
evidence is “stored in a safe place” to avoid intentional or inadvertent
destruction of potentially relevant data.33 “Once counsel takes these
steps . . . , a party is fully on notice of its discovery obligations.”34

party;
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive
to do so;
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
7. The relative benefits to the parties obtaining the information.
Id. Not much is excluded.
27. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
28. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(internal parentheticals omitted). An exception applies if the company can identify employee
documents that are stored on backup tapes. If that is the case, the tapes should be preserved if the
information contained on those tapes is not otherwise available. Id.
29. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
30. Id. at 434.
31. Id. at 433–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
32. Id. at 432.
33. Id. at 434.
34. Id. at 439.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/4

8

Esenberg: A Modest Proposal for Human Limitations on Cyberdiscovery

2012]

A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR HUMAN LIMITATIONS ON CYBERDISCOVERY

973

Zubulake and other similar cases are certainly helpful, but drawing
lessons from reported decisions still remains difficult. The cases are factintensive, and the pertinent facts are highly technical. For example: in a
recent opinion by Judge Scheindlin, subtitled “Zubulake Revisited,” it
takes forty pages to describe the E-discovery malfeasance of the plaintiff.35
A recent article describing E-discovery cases since 2006 offers relatively
little guidance beyond the commonplace. Having read its summaries of
approximately 150 cases, one knows little that is new. That is not a
criticism of the article or the cases. It is not clear that more guidance is
readily found.
In 2006, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to address
the problems presented by ESI. Pursuant to amended Rule 26(b), ESI need
not be produced from sources that the responding party has identified as
not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost subject to
judicial review. Courts may limit discovery if it is unreasonably cumulative
or duplicative or can be obtained from another source that is more
convenient, less burdensome or expensive.36 They may also restrict
discovery if the seeking party has had ample opportunity to obtain the
information or if the burden or expense of proposed discovery outweighs
“its likely benefit considering the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in
the action and the importance of discovery in resolving the issues.”37 By
case law, although not rule, parties are required to take reasonable steps to
preserve ESI when they “know or should know” of the potential relevance
to litigation. Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that “absent extraordinary circumstances, a court may not impose
sanctions” when ESI is lost “as a result of the routine, good faith operation
of an electronic information system.”38

35. Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i).
37. Id. at 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
38. Id. at 37(e).
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C. The Inadequacy of the Response
All of this is eminently reasonable but, it would seem, not particularly
effective. The standard for implementing a litigation hold is, for example,
an invitation for an argument. It does little to define what must be held or
how prescient the holding party must prove to be. Whether something is
“reasonably accessible” is undefined, as is the “routine, good faith
operation” of an information system.39 Of course, all legal standards are
more or less underdetermined, but the vague nature of these standards may
be more problematic in the context of discovery. This is largely a result of
the fact that discovery is—and must largely remain—a process largely
managed by the parties and one in which judicial intervention is difficult
due to the nascent and ill-defined nature of the issues to be tried and the
complex and technical nature of ESI.
When judicial intervention does become necessary, Judges must assess
such claims by evaluating the burden, need, and proportionality of
proposed discovery with incomplete knowledge of the claims and defenses.
The complexity of evaluating competing claims about the nature of the
information sought and the cost of obtaining it may require the equivalent
of a small (or not so small) trial—something difficult to do in the context
of motion practice. Thus, the best way to avoid a premature (and perhaps
incorrect) decision is often to err on the side of permitting discovery.
The standard of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)—the balancing of cost and
burden proportionately40—may be the principle by which most disputes
regarding the scope of discovery are resolved. That rule and its associated
principles all contemplate relatively unrestained balancing of multiple
factors. In essence, although no relevant factors are excluded, no particular
result is mandated. While it is difficult to formulate specific legal rules that
will do much more under such complex circumstances, multi-faceted and
ambiguous balancing in response to complicated and expensive questions
provide little guidance. Standards that call for things that are “reasonable”
and prohibit that which is “undue” are no better than admonitions to do
“right.” A seven-part test for anything permits almost any result.
While some have endorsed—or at least accepted—the notion of judge
as manager,41 it is hard to imagine, especially given the volume of
litigation, that discovery could work as anything other than a process that is
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, The “Two-Tiered” Approach to E-Discovery: Has Rule
26(b)(2)(B) Fulfilled Its Promise?, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 7, 14 (2008),
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v14i3/article7.pdf (explaining how the “good cause” requirements of
rule 26(b)(2)(B), when combined with the balancing required by 26(b)(2)(C), create a “substantial
hurdle to discovery”).
41. See Symposium, Ethics and Professionalism in the Digital Age, 60 MERCER L. REV. 863,
887 (2009) (declaring that “the role of the judge is in the process of extraordinary transformation
because of E-discovery”).
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largely party managed. There is simply too much litigation and too much
information for judges or special masters to become involved in more than
a fraction of cases. Management of the process by the parties works best if
there are rules that effectively provide relatively clear direction, or both
sides have comparable incentives driving them within a realm of
“reasonable behavior.” In cases in which both parties are more or less
equally subject to the costs and burdens of electronic discovery, each side
can expect the other to be just as aggressive or reasonable as it has been.
This form of mutually assured destruction may discipline the parties and
temper the discovery “arms race.” But, in cases of asymmetrical
information, namely, those in which the bulk of information (particularly
ESI) resides with one party, incentives diverge. Here the burden of
responding to discovery is largely borne by one side, and there are fewer
incentives to act with self-discipline.
Even when we do move to judicial management, judges must assess
such claims or evaluate the burden, need and proportionality of proposed
discovery with incomplete knowledge of the claims and defenses. The
rules require parties to confer, and a mantra of the E-discovery industry is
to call for “collaborative” discovery. Nevertheless, parties famously
disagree about the value of their cases and the extent of the burden that
they are asking another to assume. However they agree on the principle of
proportionality, that agreement is swamped by radically different
perceptions of the amount at stake and the likelihood of recovery. The
complexity of evaluating competing claims about highly technical
information may require the equivalent of a small (or not so small) trial—
something difficult to do in the context of motion practice and pretrial
management. The best way to avoid a premature (and perhaps incorrect)
decision—or to avoid the whole mess altogether—is to err on the side of
permitting discovery.
D. The Implications of Inadequacy
If the only implication of these inadequacies was increased costs of
discovery, that would be bad enough. But increasing the cost of litigation,
particularly in the context of a system with at least some form of notice
pleading, changes the dynamics of the litigation process and the calculus
surrounding the management of litigation risk. The ability to assert a
colorable claim, i.e., one that can survive a motion to dismiss and trigger
the process of discovery, is an asset. Because it costs something—and
often quite a lot—to make such a claim go away, and litigation risk can
rarely be dismissed—whatever increases the cost of the process increases
the value of that asset. This materially alters the settlement calculus.
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II. ANOTHER RESPONSE
A. A Modest Presumption
The rules ought to be amended to strengthen the presumption—begun
with the 2006 amendments—that adherence to retention and retrieval
policies that are adopted outside the context of litigation and consistently
applied ought to be the measure of a party’s obligation to maintain and
produce ESI. The idea, not unrelated to Rule 34’s longstanding option to
produce records as they are kept in the ordinary course of business,42 is
rooted in the idea that most organizations formulate such policies in good
faith and, in fact, probably cannot know in advance whether the retention
of information will hurt or help their litigation prospects. Questions of how
much ESI to keep, where to keep it, and how to get it are generally
determined by the need to have access to information necessary to do
business. Policies are presumably adopted in a way that will permit access
to records that one needs to address the design and performance of
products, the management of employees and other aspects of the business
that are likely to become the subject of litigation. If that is the case, most
relevant information will remain accessible under such generally applicable
and neutrally-framed policies.
To be sure, the current federal rules permit courts to limit E-discovery
to documents resident in these systems, and, at least on its face, Federal
Rule of Evidence 26(b) creates a presumption against the discovery of ESI
that is not reasonably accessible.43 But it may be well to make clear that,
absent extraordinary circumstances, a party is required to produce only that
ESI stored in the active systems maintained by the party in the ordinary
course of business. What I am suggesting is a bit of a paradigm shift:
Perhaps we need be less concerned with whether the discovery of ESI fails
beyond a pale of acceptable burden and cost, and more concerned with
whether the information sought can be found within a set of sources most
likely to contain relevant records and can be accessed in a way that a
party’s normal records management system permits.
An example of such an approach is reflected in an amendment to
Rule 26 proposed by certain defense bar organizations in a white paper
presented in a recent conference on civil litigation at Duke University Law
School. This approach specifies that certain categories of ESI that are not
available in the ordinary course of business need not be produced:
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(i) states, “A party must produce documents as they are kept in
the usual course of business . . . .”
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored
information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom
discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost.”).
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(B) Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored
Information.
(i) A party need not provide discovery of the following
categories of electronically stored information . . . absent a
showing by the receiving party of substantial need and good
cause, subject to the proportionality assessment pursuant to
Rule 26(b)(2)(C):
(a) deleted, slack, fragmented, or other data only
accessible by forensics;
(b) random access memory (RAM), temp files, or
other ephemeral data that are difficult to preserve without
disabling the operating system;
(c) on-line access data such as temporary internet
files, history, cache, cookies, and the like;
(d) data in metadata fields that are frequently
updated automatically, such as last-opened dates;
(e) information whose retrieval cannot be
accomplished without substantial additional programming, or
without transforming it into another form before search and
retrieval can be achieved;
(f) backup data that are substantially duplicative of
data that are more accessible elsewhere;
(g) physically damaged media;
(h) legacy data remaining from obsolete systems
that is unintelligible on successor systems; or
(i) any other data that are not available to the
producing party in the ordinary course of business and that the
party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost and that on motion to compel discovery or for
a protective order, if any, the party from whom discovery of
such information is sought shows is not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost.44
The proposed amendment provides additional guidance for both parties
and courts and, importantly, roots that guidance in deference to systems
established to conduct business. It retains current language requiring that,
under certain circumstances, a party seeking to withhold information that
might otherwise be discoverable must demonstrate that it is not reasonably
accessible due to undue burden and cost. However, it makes clear that
certain specified sources of information need not be searched or produced
44. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 9, at 25–26 (alteration in original).
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without such a showing, including information whose retrieval would
require substantial additional programming or transformation or which
cannot be obtained in the ordinary course of business. Although the
proposed amendment does not unambiguously establish “active” ESI under
a generally-applicable retention policy as the entire universe for Ediscovery, the recognition that most relevant documents are likely to be
found within accessible records under such policies informs its restrictions
on the scope of discovery.
This will not obviate the need for litigation holds. The fact of litigation
or its reasonable anticipation may affect the need to retain ESI, and parties
ought to remain under an obligation to preserve potential ESI once
litigation has been commenced or can be reasonably anticipated. An
amendment proposed by the white paper45 delivered at Duke calls for
parallel restrictions on the type of ESI that must be preserved, once again
providing more particular guidance that reflects a judgment about where
potentially-relevant information is most likely to be found:
(2)
Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored
Information
Absent court order demonstrating that the requesting
party has (1) a substantial need for discovery of the
electronically stored information requested and (2)
preservation is subject to the limitations of Rule 26(h)(1), a
party need not preserve the following categories of
electronically stored information:
(A) deleted, slack, fragmented, or other data only
accessible by forensics;
(B) random access memory (RAM), temp files, or
other ephemeral data that are difficult to preserve without
disabling the operating system;
(C) on-line access data such as temporary internet
files, history, cache, cookies, and the like;
(D) data in metadata fields that are frequently updated
automatically, such as last-opened dates;
(E) information whose retrieval cannot be
accomplished without substantial additional programming, or
without transferring it into another form before search and
retrieval can be achieved;
(F) backup data that are substantially duplicative of
data that are more accessible elsewhere;

45. Id.
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(G) physically damaged media;
(H) legacy data remaining from obsolete systems that
is unintelligible on successor systems; or
(I) any other data that are not available to the
producing party in the ordinary course of business.46
It is certainly possible that the exclusion of these sources of
information from preservation and production will eliminate some
information that might be relevant to litigation. It is less clear that they will
render the results less accurate.
The amendments proposed at Duke also modify Rule 37(e) to make
clear that sanctions may not be imposed for the failure to preserve ESI in
the absence of a finding of willful conduct.47 This expansion of the rule’s
safe harbor provision places the emphasis on normally-followed retention
and retrieval procedures. The difficulty, however, is that sanctions for
failure to preserve documents generally contain some presumption that the
lost information would have helped the requesting party or hurt the party
who has failed to produce it. But, in the absence of some finding of
willfulness, that presumption is unwarranted. Although a responding party
might certainly be required to restore the cost of recovering lost ESI,
further sanctions as a consequence of negligence are problematic, at least
in the absence of some information about whether lost ESI would have
helped or hurt the responding party.
B. Cost Allocation
The amendments proposed by the defense bar accomplish additional
useful objectives, such as limiting the number of document requests and
the sources that can be searched.48 Nevertheless, limitation of the universe
of ESI that must be preserved and produced won’t resolve all of the special
challenges presented by E-discovery. Even active data systems maintained
by parties in the ordinary course of business may produce enormous
quantities of information. Presumably, parties will create methods of
retrieving pertinent information for business purposes that balance the
needs of that information with the cost of retrieval. Those systems ought to
be treated as presumptively sufficient.
But most regularly-maintained databases are subject to some form of
keyword or other electronic search that will, even without duplicates, result
in mass quantities of information that will be exceedingly expensive—or
even stretch human capacities—to review. Perhaps the best solution to this
46. Id. at 36–37.
47. Id. at 38.
48. I am old enough to have been a seasoned litigator when courts began to limit—and rather
arbitrarily at that—the number of interrogatories and both the number and length of depositions.
How, we wondered, could the search for truth be continued? It turns out we managed quite well.
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problem is to place the cost of discovery with the requesting party.
Internalization of externalized costs is generally thought to lead to greater,
rather than less, efficiency. Perhaps the best way to ensure that the cost of
discovery is proportional to what is at stake is to ask whether the party
seeking it—the one who is presumably in the best position to know—is
willing to pay for it.49
While this may be thought to burden the ability of less wealthy litigants
to pursue a claim, the investment of substantial resources into litigation on
behalf of non-wealthy parties thought by counsel to have a meritorious
claim is quite common in a variety of contexts and has not materially
impeded the pursuit of claims.
Although these costs would presumably be taxable upon resolution of
the case on the merits, very few cases are resolved on the merits. To be
sure, the fact that the cost of discovery is potentially taxable would affect
the settlement calculus and indirectly discipline discovery. But a more
direct impact would require these costs to be paid at the time that they are
incurred. While this might lead to pretrial satellite litigation over the
reasonableness of those costs, this seems more manageable and predictable
than the more amorphous standards that currently control. It would involve
the rather straightforward question of what undertaking a particular task
has or will cost and not an assessment of whether, at some point in the
future after underdeveloped issues become clear, it will have been “worth
it.”
CONCLUSION
I close with a story from my young days as a lawyer. Rising to begin
the introduction of my rebuttal case in a trial to the bench, the judge looked
down at me and said, “Now, Mr. Esenberg, you do what you need to do.
But first ask yourself if anything you are about to do proves anything that
hasn't been proven four times already, because I'm ready to rule.” I sat
down, learning an important lesson of trial advocacy: when to stop.
“When to stop” E-discovery is a difficult question. My modest
suggestion is that lawyers take their cue from the ways in which such
information is managed in the “real world.” The electronic revolution has
enabled many wonderful possibilities, but in litigation and elsewhere, we
ought not to allow our desire for the perfect become the enemy of the good.

49. A full consideration of this idea is beyond the scope of this paper.
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